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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Respondent petitions for rehearing of this Court's
holding that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) violates the Utah
Constitution, and is thus invalid.

In support of its Petition,

Respondent improperly raises several arguments for the first
time.

Respondent actually appears to be seeking an entirely new

hearing, rather than a rehearing of issues raised on appeal but
misconstrued or misapprehended.

Moreover, Respondent's arguments

are unsupported by, or even contradict, Utah law.
As demonstrated below, the Utah Court of Appeals is
constitutionally and statutorily empowered to pass on the
constitutional validity of a statute.

In assessing the validity

of § 78-12-31.1, the Court properly concluded that the habeas
corpus provision of the Utah Constitution affords Appellant Carl
McClellan ("McClellan") the civil remedy he seeks.

Thus, the

Court correctly employed a heightened standard of review pursuant
to the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
I.

Respondent Cannot Raise Arguments in Support of
its Petition for Rehearing That it Failed to Raise
on Appeal.
The arguments in Respondent's Petition for Rehearing

are here raised for the first time.

Notwithstanding that

McClellan clearly had put the constitutionality of § 78-12-31.1
at issue in his appeals brief, (see Brief for Appellant at 6-12),
Respondent did not advance the positions represented in its
Petition in either its response brief or at oral argument.

On

appeal, McClellan argued that § 78-12-31.1 unconstitutionally

infringed on due process rights secured by the Utah
Constitution's habeas corpus provision, (Brief for Appellant at
6-7); only now does Respondent attempt to argue that Utah's
habeas corpus provision affords relief only in cases of a
sentencing court's imperfect jurisdiction, (Respondent's Pet.
Reh. at 5-8).

Also on appeal, McClellan argued that § 78-12-31.1

violated the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution by
impairing his right to habeas corpus relief, (Brief for Appellant
at 7-9); only now does Respondent attempt to argue that the open
courts provision is inapplicable because the habeas corpus
remedies it safeguards do not include due process rights,
(Respondent's Pet. Reh. at 5-8). Further, notwithstanding that
McClellan brought his constitutional challenge before this Court,
Respondent has waited until now to contest this Court's
jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of a statute,
fid, at 3-5.)
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that a
petition for rehearing shall particularly describe "the points of
law or fact which the petitioner claims the court has overlooked
or misapprehended."

Utah R. App. P. 35(a).

The rule seems

designed to afford a court an opportunity to remedy mistakes.
However, this Court could not have "overlooked" or
"misapprehended" claimed points of law which Respondent never
brought to its attention.

This Court should not allow Respondent

to supplement its appeals brief under the subterfuge of a

2

petition for rehearing.

See, e.g.. State v. Sampson. 808 P.2d

1100, 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).l
II,

This Court Has Constitutional and Statutory
Authority to Declare a Statute Unconstitutional,
Respondent argues that, under the Utah Constitution,

the Utah Supreme Court is the only Utah court empowered to
declare a statute unconstitutional.

She bases this argument on

an inference from language in the Utah Constitution stating that
"[t]he [supreme] court shall not declare any law unconstitutional
. . . except on concurrence of a majority of all justices of the
Supreme Court."

Utah Const, art. VIII, § 2.

From this language,

she makes the substantial leap that not only must a majority of
the Court concur to invalidate a statute, but that only the
Supreme Court is empowered to invalidate a statute. However,
nothing in the quoted language or the surrounding language of
article VIII, section 2, which defines the operating procedures
of the Supreme Court, dictates such a result.

Further,

*In Sampson. the Court of Appeals noted its "standing
aversion to considering for the first time at some later stage
issues that could have been raised at an earlier stage," and
stated "we ordinarily will not consider arguments presented for
the first time on petition for rehearing." 808 P.2d at 1112.
The Court, however, felt the synergy of several factors existing
in the case warranted an exception. There were voluminous issues
of significant complexity; the State7s brief greatly exceeded the
page limit for briefs even without addressing several issues; the
United States Supreme Court rendered a helpful opinion subsequent
to initial argument; and the newly raised issue was important to
a proper disposition of the case. Id. at 1112-13.
Even if the issues Respondent raises in her Petition
for Rehearing are deemed important to the resolution of the
instant case, the other factors listed in Sampson are
inapplicable. Furthermore, Respondent had ample opportunity on
appeal to make the arguments she raises in the Petition.
3

Respondent's creative interpretation ignores other important
constitutional provisions sculpting the aegis of the State's
judicial department.
The Utah Constitution provides that judicial power in
Utah shall vest in a Supreme Court and a trial court of general
jurisdiction, "and in such other courts as the Legislature by
statute shall establish."

Utah Const, art. VIII, § 1.

The

constitution further provides that the jurisdiction of such
"other courts, both original and appellate, shall be provided by
statute."

Id. § 5.

Respondent essentially argues that the

constitutional language requiring that the Supreme Court declare
a statute unconstitutional by a majority impliedly limits the
Legislature's authority to establish the jurisdiction of
appellate courts.

This argument by implication, however, ignores

a "fundamental principlef]" of state constitutional law.

Trade

Comm'n v. Skaaas Drug Centers. Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah
1968).

As the Court in State v. Tavlor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah

1983), noted, "Clearly, the Legislature has the power to confer
appellate jurisdiction in connection with the decisions of any
inferior court where such jurisdiction is not expressly
prohibited by the Constitution.

Appellate jurisdiction . . . may

exist by virtue of a constitutional grant or by statute."
441.

Id. at

Thus, implied constitutional limitations on the

Legislature's power "'are not, and should not be, favored, and
ought not be imposed by the courts, except where the implication
is both necessary and unavoidable.'" Id. at 443-44 (quoting
4

McCashland v. Keocrh, 88 P. 680, 682 (Utah 1906))).
Court explained,

As the Skaaas

,f

the legislature of the state is not a

government of powers limited to those expressly granted, as is
the federal government . • . . The legislature of the state,
which represents the people and thus the sovereign, has all of
the residuum of power of government, except only as expressly
restricted by the Constitution."

446 P.2d at 962; Wood v, Budge,

374 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1962); Parkinson v. Watson, 291 P.2d 400,
405 (Utah 1955).

Thus, Respondent's suggestion of

constitutionally implied limitations on the Legislature's power
to define the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals would overturn
one of the most central tenets of our nation's political system.
Because the Constitution does not expressly limit the
Legislature's authority to define this Court's jurisdiction, the
proper focus is whether the Legislature has authorized the Court
of Appeals to declare a law unconstitutional.

See TaylorP 664

P.2d at 442.
In 1986, the Utah Legislature created the Utah Court of
Appeals.
115, 135.

Act of April 28, 1986, ch. 47, § 44, 1986 Utah Laws
The Legislature provided the Court with appellate

jurisdiction over, inter alia, "cases transferred to the Court of
Appeals from the Supreme Court."
(Supp. 1993).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k)

Importantly, in defining the Supreme Court's

appellate jurisdiction, the Legislature specifically allowed that
court to "transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the matters

5

over which the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction."2
78-2-2(4).

Id, §

Therefore, because the Utah Constitution empowers the

Supreme Court to declare a law unconstitutional, Utah Const, art.
VIII, S 2, it may "pour over" that determination to the Court of
Appeals.
This interpretation is bolstered by the statute
providing the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over "a final
judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face
under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah
Constitution."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(g) (Supp. 1993).

This

language assumes that the Court of Appeals, as a court of record,
id. § 78-2a-l (1992), has jurisdiction to consider the
constitutional validity of a statute.3
Taken to its logical conclusion, Respondent7s argument
also challenges the authority of a district court to measure a
law against a constitutional yardstick.

Yet the Supreme Court

2

The Legislature created exceptions to this rule, but none
of them apply to a constitutional determination. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(4)(a)-(e) (Supp. 1993).

Respondent concedes that the Court of Appeals may affirm
the constitutional validity of a statute, but argues that it must
transfer the determination to the Utah Supreme Court when the
Court of Appeals believes a statute is unconstitutional. In
other words, this Court may pass on the constitutionality of a
law only to affirm it — a strange sort of partial jurisdiction.
Further, Respondent suggests that this Court may determine that a
statute is unconstitutional, but that it must then transfer the
case to the Utah Supreme Court for a binding determination. This
not only would be a tremendous waste of judicial resources, but
would frustrate the very purpose for which the Court of Appeals
was created — to reduce the Supreme Court's case load.
6

has upheld district court determinations that a statute is
unconstitutional.

See, e.g.. Salt Lake Citv v. Wheeler, 466 P.2d

838, 838-40 (Utah 1970) (affirming district court's invalidation
of statute allowing warrantless search of premises licensed for
consumption of liquor).

It would be anomalous indeed for a

district court to be empowered to find a statute
unconstitutional, but for the Court of Appeals to be unable to
fully review that decision on appeal*
In sum# nothing in the Utah Constitution prohibits a
court other than the Utah Supreme Court from declaring a statute
unconstitutional.

On the contrary, the Constitution authorizes

the Legislature to create appellate courts of record and to
define their jurisdiction.

Pursuant to this authority, the

Legislature established the Court of Appeals and empowered it to
pass on the constitutional validity of state statutes.

Contrary

to Respondent's contentions, this Court should not elevate a
procedural mechanism governing the operative capacity of the
Supreme Court to a substantive limitation on the constitutional
authority of the Legislature to define the jurisdiction of other
courts of record.
III. The Habeas Corpus Provision of the Utah
Constitution Affords Appellant a Remedy Which Is
Protected from Legislative Abrogation by the Utah
Constitution's Open Courts Provision.
This Court correctly determined that the statute of
limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) impinges on the
Utah Constitution's habeas corpus provision, Utah Const, art. I,
§ 5, and thus implicates the State's open courts provision, Utah
7

Const, art. I, § 11. Accordingly, in evaluating the
constitutionality of S 78-12-31.1, this Court properly employed a
heightened standard of scrutiny.

Respondent's argument to the

contrary advances a pinched conception of the safeguards
established by Utah's open courts and habeas corpus provisions
that is contrary to well-established Utah law.
The open courts provision was promulgated to ensure
"that an individual could not be arbitrarily deprived of
effective remedies designed to protect basic individual rights."
Berry ex rel. Berrv v. Beech Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670, 675
(Utah 1985).

As the Berrv Court elaborated, M[w]hat section 11

is primarily concerned with is not particular, identifiable
causes of action as such, but with the availability of legal
remedies for vindicating the great interest that individuals in a
civilized society have in the integrity of their persons,
property, and reputations."

Id. at 677 n.4.

The writ of habeas corpus is designed to protect
against impairment of such basic individual rights.

The Utah

Supreme Court has defined the writ as "one of the most important
of all judicial tools for the protection of individual liberty."
Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989); see also Thompson
v. Harris. 144 P.2d 761, 766 (Utah 1943) (describing habeas
corpus as "the precious safeguard of personal liberty").

Thus,

if the open courts provision protects any claims, it must protect
those of the constitutional significance of Utah's habeas corpus
provision.
8

Notwithstanding the provision's fundamental role in
safeguarding individual liberty, Respondent seeks to unravel
decades of habeas corpus jurisprudence in Utah and restrict the
provision to its function at common law.

Respondent argues that

the habeas provision in the Utah Constitution currently affords
no greater protection than that provided at common law, and cites
Hurst for the proposition that at common law habeas corpus was
only applicable to questions of jurisdiction.

Respondent

apparently failed to notice the very next sentence in Hurst,
which states:

"However, even before the adoption of post-

conviction-type remedies in this state, this Court recognized
that the writ of habeas corpus had a broader application to
criminal proceedings than merely testing whether a conviction or
sentence falls within the authority of the court."
P.2d at 1034.

Hurst, 777

That habeas corpus protects constitutional rights

regardless of whether the alleged error is jurisdictional in
nature was recognized in Utah at least as early as 1943.

See

Thompson, 144 P.2d at 766 ("it has been held that the writ will
lie if the petitioner has been deprived of one of his
constitutional rights such as due process of law.").

Thus, as

the Supreme Court concluded in Hurst, the function of habeas
corpus in Utah "is to provide a means for collaterally attacking
convictions when they are so constitutionally flawed that they
result in fundamental unfairness and to provide for collateral
attack of sentences not authorized by law."
1034-35 (emphasis added).

9

Hurst, 777 P.2d at

Respondent also argues that this Court has conflated
the post-conviction remedies of Rule 65B with the habeas corpus
provision of the Utah Constitution.

However, the true confusion

exists in Respondent's own argument.

Rule 65B merely

"establish[es] procedural rules for implementation of habeas and
post-conviction relief remedies.11

Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1032.

Thus, the Rule does not create substantive causes of action
separate from the habeas provision in the Constitution, but
instead breathes life into remedies that inhere in the provision
itself.

See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (listing procedural

rules for attacking wrongful imprisonment); Hurst, 777 P.2d at
1033 ("Although a post-conviction relief remedy and the writ of
habeas corpus have sometimes been thought to be separate
procedures, the writ of habeas corpus has, over the years,
absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy to form a single
constitutional remedy.").
This Court correctly interpreted the scope of the
habeas corpus provision in the Utah Constitution — it protects
rights to fundamental fairness as well as prohibiting
extrajurisdictional exercises of judicial authority.
Respondent's interpretation ignores the Utah Supreme Court's
express construction of the provision.

Given that the Supreme

Court's interpretation that the habeas corpus provision assures
more than jurisdictional remedies, this Court properly determined
that the statute of limitations in § 78-12-31.1 impinged upon
McClellan's habeas corpus rights, thus implicating the open
10

courts provision and its heightened standard of review.

If the

open courts provision is to be taken seriously, it must at least
protect express constitutional rights, such as habeas corpus.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
deny Respondent's Petition for Rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of October, 1993.
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Arthur B. Berger
Attorneys for Petitioner/
Appellant McClellan
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